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LANGUAGE RIGHTS AS A LEGACY OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

T

1964

Ming Hsu Chen*

HE fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers an

important opportunity to reflect on an earlier moment when civil
rights evolved to accommodate new waves of immigration. This
essay seeks to explain how civil rights laws evolved to include rights for
immigrants and non-English speakers. More specifically, it seeks to explain how policy entrepreneurs in agencies read an affirmative right to
language access.'
Part I provides theoretical context for understanding language rights as
a legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part II sets forth the historical
trajectory of language rights in schools. Part III concludes with reflections
on the lessons of history for today.
I. LANGUAGE RIGHTS AS A LEGACY OF CIVIL RIGHTS
The puzzle that motivates this essay is the emergence of language rights
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The U.S. Department of Education
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) advanced guidance interpreting these statutes to include concrete legal protections for language minorities in the
course of administering the national origin discrimination provision in
these statutes. 2 OCR guidance led to the inception of bilingual education
in public schools, an ambitious regulatory undertaking that remains in
Title VI law. 3 The question is how these regulatory conceptions of language rights took hold, absent statutory language clearly providing for
them.
Social science accounts of law and social change tend to focus on individual rights and emphasize the role of courts in their creation. The predominant account of civil rights as a case study for understanding the
capacity of law to effectuate change, for example, features prominently
*
Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to Rose CuisonVillazor and the AALS Minority Section and Civil Rights Section for including my essay in
their fiftieth anniversary panel discussion.
1. This essay is adapted from Ming H. Chen, Governing by Guidance: Civil Rights
Agencies and the Emergence of Language Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291 (2014)
and Ming H. Chen, Regulatory Rights: Courts and Agencies Constructing "National Origin" Discrimination as Language Rights in Schools and Workplaces, 1965-1980 (June
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Chen, Dissertation].
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
3. 28 U.S.C. 2009 (2012).
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the landmark Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 These accounts neglect regulatory agencies
as institutional change actors. In contrast, administrative law scholars
consider agencies very seriously. Because of their emphasis on judicial
review as the fulcrum of the relationship between courts and agencies,
however, they underestimate the political significance of regulatory
claims that are not, strictly speaking, enforceable in court.5 For example,
a leading administrative law treatise consists of three volumes, runs over
a thousand pages, and spends less than a single chapter discussing guidance. This chapter discusses only their exemption from Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking procedures for agency rules that carry
the force of law. 6 The same balance between rules and exceptions is kept
in most administrative law casebooks and courses.7 The result of this uneven coverage is to create an impression that guidance is an insignificant
legal topic, despite its power to shape industry practices and inform the
general public.
This essay brings together the virtues of social science and administrative law and tries to cure some of their deficits. The essay's intention is to
draw attention to agency guidance as a distinctive breed of policymaking
in the modern state. Also, the essay illuminates the civil rights era as a
historical moment when the practice of governing by guidance-a practice under attack today-was used to great effect. The next section sets
forth the puzzling emergence of language rights in schools as a case study
for a theory of policy innovation in agencies.

4. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SoCIAL CHANGE (Benjamin I. Page ed., 2d ed. 2008); Michael McCann, Reform Litigation on
Trial, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 715, 718 (1992).
5. Attention to judicial deference has jumped since the Supreme Court's 2001 decision Mead distinguishing the levels of deference afforded legislative and nonlegislative
rules. See, e.g., David Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 280-82 (2010).
6. RICHARD PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2009) (Chapter 6
references guidance only indirectly and as an exception to the APA rulemaking
procedures.).
7. The same pattern is seen in other leading administrative law casebooks. See, e.g.
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES

&

MATERIALS (2010); STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ADRIAN VERMEMULE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY (7th ed. 2011),
WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE & PRACTICE (5th ed. 2014). But cf LISA SHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN, &
KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE (2d ed. 2013); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2d 2013) (casebooks developed
for 1L courses that take into account the broader political context surrounding common
law).
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II. THE PUZZLING EMERGENCE OF LANGUAGE RIGHTS
FROM TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A.

BACKGROUND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MEETS IMMIGRATION REFORM

AcT

The convergence of immigration reform with the Civil Rights Act represents a critical juncture in American political development. Against the
backdrop of an expanding civil rights state, the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965
lifted national origin quotas and led to increased Asian and Latin American migration.8 The scope and scale of demographic change was unprecedented. 9 "Third world" immigration and the numbers of non-native
English speakers crested and many were excluded from vital institutions
and government services because of language gaps.10 Failing to bridge
those gaps meant diminished chances for academic, economic, and political success."
In a break from earlier civil rights struggles, non-English speaking
Asians and Hispanics took advantage of institutional channels to redress
their concerns. 12 Instead of campaigning in the streets, they complained
to the agencies responsible for enforcing civil rights laws. 13 In response,
agency officials launched proactive investigations, set demanding compliance standards, and ramped up enforcement. 14 In essence, the administrative response transformed language barriers into a legally redressable
problem. 15 Muddling their way through the policy thicket, agencies set
out to make legal rights "real" in the administrative state.1 6 The development of that administrative response is the heart of this essay.

B. OCR

INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VI NATIONAL
ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION

Racial inequities in schools constituted the front line in the struggle for
equal opportunity during the civil rights era. Segregated schools that were
THE GOLDEN DOOR: THE THIRD WORLD COMES
62 (1992).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. For more on the effects of language gaps, consult the resources of ethnic minority
8. See

DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL

To AMERICA

groups such as the Asian American Justice Center & MALDEF. See, e.g., ASIAN AMERICAN JUST. CTR.

GRANT

&

MALDEF, LANGUAGE RIGHTS: AN INTEGRATION AGENDA FOR IMMI-

COMMUNITIES

(June 2008),

available at https://www.maldef.org/resources/

publications/language-rights-briefing-bookJune%202008.pdf; ASIAN AMERICAN JUST.
CTR. & MALDEF, ADULT LITERACY EDUCATION IN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES: IDENTIFYING POLICY AND PROGRAM PRIORITIES FOR HELPING NEWCOMERS LEARN ENGLISH

(2007), http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/IM3622H5009.pdf.
12. See CHARLES Epp, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS,

AND THE

CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 2-4 (2010). Epp describes 1970s reforms in police

misconduct, sexual harassment, affirmative action, and playground safety as taking on a
law-styled attempt to bring bureaucratic practice into line with emerging legal norms.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
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identifiably black or white posed the most glaring example of state-supported inequality.' 7 Similar practices isolated Mexican and Chinese
school children in segregated schools.1 8 Moreover, subtle forms of discrimination and benign neglect left many of these school children functionally separate within ostensibly integrated schools. 19 In San Francisco's
Chinatown, for example, Chinese students enrolled in the San Francisco
Unified School District (SFUSD) suffered language isolation. 20 Concentrated numbers of non-English speakers attended segregated schools in
Chinatown or were lumped together in English-speaking classrooms with
other immigrants who spoke neither English nor Chinese. 21 Most were
completely excluded from English-language classroom instruction given
the unavailability of Chinese-English bilingual education.
In response to linguistic isolation in Chinatown, Legal Aid attorney
Edward Steinman challenged the school district's language policies, or
lack thereof, in the Northern District of California. 22 His opening brief
characterized SFUSD's practices as benign neglect, not borne of intentional discrimination, but nevertheless barring Chinese students from educational instruction.23 It alleged that the denial of education on the basis
of language exclusion violated the Fourteenth Amendment, California's
constitution, and a number of city codes and school district policies. 24 The
brief's main innovation on past equality law was to claim that ensuring
equal opportunity required more than affording the same treatment for
differently situated students. 25
The same year that Steinman launched litigation in district court, the
OCR issued policy guidance outlining an administrative response. The
OCR accumulated evidence regarding the "systematic lower achievement
17. Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 710, 711, 724
(2004).
18. Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice & Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 177-78 (2005); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
19. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
20. Id. at 564.
21. See L. Ling-Chi Wang, Lau v. Nichols: History of a Struggle for Equal and Quality
Education, in DON NAKANISHI & TINA NISHIDA, THE ASIAN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL
EXPERIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 62-63 (1995). See also Interview with L. Ling-Chi Wang, Chinatown activist and U.C. Berkeley Ethnic Studies profes-

sor in Berkeley, CA (Dec. 2008).
22. See generally, Lau, 414 U.S. 563.
23. See generally, Brief for Petitioners at 48, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No.

72-6520), 1973 WL 172369 at *48.
24. Id. at *20.
25. Id. at *41. An overview of the Lau v. Nichols litigation is contained in Rachel F.
Moran, The Story of Lau v. Nichols: Breaking the Silence in Chinatown, EDUCATION LAW
STORIES 111-57 (Michael A. Olivas & Roma Griff Schneider eds.,2007); see also GARETH
DAVIES, SEE GOVERNMENT GROw: EDUCATION POLITICS FROM JOHNSON To REAGAN

147-65 (2007) (Chapter 6 cites Shirley Hufstedler papers from Carter Presidential Library
in Atlanta, GA); LEON E. PANETrA & PORTER GALL, BRING Us TOGETHER: THE NIXON
TEAM AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT 335-56 (1971); GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 89
(1969); JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 179-229 (2002); SANDRA DEL VALLE, LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDING

OUR VOICES 235-48 (2003).
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of minority group children and the existence of large numbers of segregated ability-grouping and special education classes." 26 In consultation
with MALDEF, bilingual educators, and education psychologists, the
OCR began to research policy solutions to these problems. On May 25,
1970, the OCR released Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination. 27
The memo set forth highly specific procedures for schools to develop and
assess their own bilingual education programs. 28 The Guidelines require a
school to take "affirmative steps" to rectify language deficiencies of national origin minority students. 29 These affirmative steps mainly included
the implementation of bilingual-bicultural curricula, the installation of bilingual teachers in mainstream schools, or other programs designed to
help students quickly attain needed language skills without operating as
an educational dead-end or permanent track. 30 In defense of its authority
for the guidelines, the OCR pointed to Title VI itself and the Fifth Circuit's announcement that it would give "'great weight"' to the OCR's
guidelines in United States v. Jefferson County.3 '
The litigation-based and administrative challenges converged on appeal
in the Ninth Circuit and United States Supreme Court. Steinman and
Stanley Pottinger (representing the OCR) split their oral argument into
two parts: Steinman argued that SFUSD practices violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Pottinger argued that
they violated Title VI as interpreted by the OCR. 3 2 At the urging of the
Justices, statutory issues overshadowed constitutional ones during oral argument.3 3 The OCR pleaded that Title VI is "neither dependent upon
nor necessarily coincident with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 34 The OCR then defended its regulatory authority
in several ways. First, the OCR built the case for agency deference by
citing prior instances in which its rulemaking authority had been upheld.35 Second, it alluded to the origins of the May 25 memo in compli26. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Conditional
Motion to Stay at 7, United States v. G. 1. Forum, No. 6:71-CV-5281 WWJ (E.D. Tex. Filed
July 10 2005) (containing statement of Martin Gerry, Acting Director of OCR).
27. Identification of Discrimination & Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origen, 35 Fed. Reg. 11595-96 (July 17, 1970).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.; United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
Jefferson was the culmination of judicial review over a series of cases evaluating agency
authority in school desegregation under Title VI.
32. Oral Argument, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 72-6520), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_72_6520.
33. Id.
34. See Memorandum Bf. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL 172359.
35. The petitioner brief cites United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966), a parallel lawsuit defending OCR's desegregation strategy, and Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). Brief for the Petitioners at 47-48, Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 7206520), 1973 WL 172369, at *47-48.
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ance reviews as evidence of the agency's expertise in the matter. 36 Third,
it justified its threat of cutting off funding to public schools under the
statutory provision upon which the guidance relied.3 7 The OCR's interpretations of its own authority were backed by the National Education
Association, which stated in an amicus brief that the OCR "regulations
have the 'force of law."' 38
In response, the SFUSD conceded the factual record and argued good
faith.3 9 They claimed to offer "equal educational opportunities" to English speakers and non-English speaking students. 40 However, neither the
Equal Protection Clause nor Title VI of the Civil Rights Act required
them to provide "special assistance" in the absence of discriminatory intent. 41 The school district characterized the case as involving "students
with a language difficulty which is directly related to the accidents of
birth- national origin, native tongue of parents, and exposure to ambient verbal communications in other tongues than English. It is a difficulty
not of the school district's making." 42 Therefore, no affirmative duties
applied. 43
The Supreme Court sided with the students: "Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing
students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for
students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from
any meaningful education." 44 It concluded, "'Where inability to speak
and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority
group children from effective participation . . ., the district must take affirmative steps . . . to open its instructional program to these students." 45
With regard to regulatory authority, the Court said, "By § 602 of the Act
[the Department of Education] is authorized to issue rules, regulations,
and orders to make sure that recipients of federal aid under its jurisdiction conduct any federally financed projects consistently with § 601."46
Without questioning whether the Department of Education acted pursu36. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 23; see also Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M.
Alcala, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HAItv C.R.C.L. L. Riv. 307, 370 (1972) (linking migration study to OCR compliance reviews and
OCR's May 25 memo).
37. Section 601 tasks OCR with interpretive authority over Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. Section 602 provides the agency with substantive rulemaking authority to effectuate
those purposes. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 23, at *13.
38. See Brief for the Nat'l Educ. Ass'n & the Cali. Teachers Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 19, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 72-6520), 1973 WL
172366.
39. Brief of Respondents at 1-2, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 72-6520)
1973 WL 172357.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 9, 15-16 ("This is the extent of the regulations application. Should they be
interpreted to extend beyond regulating constitutional violations, then they have been
adopted in excess of the congressional delegation of authority and are invalid.").
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
45. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 567.
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ant to its substantive rulemaking authority when issuing its Guidelines,
the Supreme Court deferred to the OCR's substantive interpretation of
Title VI as requiring extra efforts to accommodate non-English speaking
students. The OCR Guidance upheld in Lau remains in effect today, although in a somewhat altered state. 4 7 What is unchanged, however, is the
regulatory framework for investigating and ensuring compliance with Title VI.
III.

CONCLUSION

Some will question the persistence of the language rights described in
this essay given the weakening of bilingual education in many states.
Others will question the vitality of the regulatory rights described in this
essay on the grounds that they are cast in guidance, not even binding
regulations. In this concluding section, I would like to suggest-perhaps
optimistically-that language rights and agency policymaking remain persistent and vital legacies of civil rights.
First, on its own terms, it is true that implementation of the Title VI
national origin clause has been altered by intervening developments in
state and federal law. 4 8 However, the legacy of language rights under Title VI extends beyond bilingual education. Courts transformed Title VI
from a judicial enforcement mechanism for protecting constitutional
rights into a statutory vehicle for regulatory rights. The elevation of statutes displaced longstanding reliance on the Constitution for the protection of civil rights, and it enabled broader reach for regulation. While the
broadest application of the regulatory strategy has attracted critics, the
use of agency action-anchored in federal civil rights statutes and safeguarded by courts-endures in moderated form. 4 9 Modern administrative
agencies define and gather evidence about "discrimination" in a variety
47. While the legal principle initiated in the 1970 Guidelines then buffered in Lau v.
Nichols and in the EEOA remains good law on the books and in action, the remedy of
bilingual education provided for in the internal memorandum was eroded by a competing
legal precedent. A Fifth Circuit case, Castafieda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1010 (5th Cir.
1981), lowered the burden on school districts to demonstrate that their educational plan
could meet regulatory standards for compliance. The current framework guiding the
court's analysis looks to whether the school district took "appropriate action."
48. In addition to changes in federal law, some states have enacted legal barriers to
bilingual education as a specific remedy for language barriers. California's Proposition 227,
for example, requires public schools to enroll LEP students in intensive language courses
taught almost exclusively in English and to transfer them to mainstream classes within one
year. English Language in Public Schools Initiative Statute, Proposition 227 (1998), http://
primary98.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/227text.htm.
49. Essentially, under this model, courts deciding Title VI civil rights complaints have
shifted from reviewing an agency's interpretation of the underlying statute to reviewing an
organization's fidelity to the regulation itself. Justice Stevens, in his dissent for the seminal
case reviewing Title VI since Lau, laments a loss of the interdependence between agency
rulemaking and judicial enforcement after Lau as an "integrated remedial scheme." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 304 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf Rose Cuisor
Villazor, Language Rights and Loss of JudicialRemedy: The Impact of Alexander v. Sandoval on Language Minorities, in AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CivIL RIGHTS UNDER
SIEGE AND THE NEw STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUST[iCE 142 (2005).
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of contexts. They monitor the compliance of thousands of public and private organizations and redress noncompliance costing millions of dollars.
The scope of the regulatory enterprise makes many of us dependent on
administrative agencies, even though the agency's statutory interpretations and regulatory policies are not legally binding per se.
Second, Title VI enforcement extends beyond schools. Its radiating effects can be seen in policies and laws extending language access to virtually all public institutions,5 0 providing lawful immigration status to
undocumented students, and amending the Voting Rights Act.
Executive Order 13166. Following a contraction of civil rights and increasing hostility toward language rights from 1980-1990, the federal government's commitment to extending meaningful access to Limited
English Proficiency (LEP) persons through civil rights agencies revived in
2000. In 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13166, which renewed and extends the federal framework for providing LEP persons
meaningful access to regulatory programs to virtually every agency that
administers federal funds. 5' President Bush maintained Executive Order
13166, and President Obama has expanded it, which illustrates the entrenchment of a regulation-based approach toward language access that
cuts across political parties. 52 Moreover, President Obama's use of executive orders has been used to the benefit of undocumented students in the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. 53
Votiing Rights Act. Civil rights norms governing educational opportunity for national origin minorities also seeped into the justifications for
Voting Rights Act Sections 4(f) and 203. Congress declared it "patently
unfair" to require literacy from the same minority voters to whom educational opportunities had been denied; after all, many of these language
barriers resulted from "unequal educational opportunities having been
50. U.S. Gov'i ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGR., LANGUAGE ACCESS:
AGENCIES CAN IMPROVE SERVICES TO LIMITD ENGLISH PROFICIENT PERSONS

SELECI-E

(2012).
51. The order entrusts agencies to evaluate their own practices as well the practices of
schools, workplaces, and other regulated institutions. To provide a concrete illustration
using a familiar example: under EO 13166, the Department of Education (federal agency)
must comply with Title VI, the DOJ regulations, and its own policy guidance because it
administers K-12 schooling (federal financial assistance) to school districts (recipient) and
oversees the actions of public school teachers (sub-recipients.) An audit of EO 13166 compliance documents revealed that, as of February 2010, twenty-two agencies had completed

and posted online policy guidance for their beneficiaries to bear in mind when interacting
with LEP persons. Fifty-eight agencies had submitted their own plans to ensure meaningful
access to their services. U.S. GOV'T AccoUNTABIITY OFFICE, supra note 50 at 73.

52. Memorandum from the Atty. Gen. on Fed. Gov't's Renewed Commitment to Language Access Obligations Under Executive Order 13166 at 2 (Feb. 17, 2011).
53. Nearly 500,000 applications have been approved since DACA's issuance in 2012,
and the beneficiaries are now considered lawfully present. Top Five Immigration Stories
from 2013, IMMIGRATION IMPACr (Dec. 24, 2013), http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/12/
24/top-five-immigration-stories-from-2013/. Renewals for the two-year program are underway. See U.S. CYTIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, RENEW YOUR DACA, available at
http://www.USCis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-pro
cess/renew-your-daca.
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afforded these citizens." 5 4 The establishment of legal requirements for
language access in schools enhanced the government's obligations at the
polls: whereas benign neglect of non-English speaking students was previously permissible, the failure to bridge language barriers now constituted
a failure of the public schools to prepare future citizens to vote. On the
basis of accumulated evidence that more "catching up" was necessary, the
DOJ accepted its responsibility "'to take action to ensure that minority
citizens whose usual language is not English receive adequate election
materials and necessary assistance in the usual language to' meaningfully
participate. "5
So what do these lessons of history portend for the modem moment?
Reflecting on 1960s civil rights laws, the US Commission on Civil Rights
accurately observed that "[c]ivil rights laws now apply in almost every
area in which the federal government has responsibilities. It is not so
much new laws that are required today as a strengthened capacity to
make existing laws work." 56 It was true then, and it is mostly true now. In
areas ranging from voting rights to immigration reform, the nation awaits
federal action. This essay suggests that policy reformers might helpfully
shift their gaze from Congress to regulatory agencies within the executive
branch as the guardians of civil rights. Agencies can reinterpret the
promises of civil rights statutes without needing to directly confront the
hurdles of partisan politics in Congress, and they are relatively more insulated from politics than in the White House. In essence, the lesson of
language rights emerging on the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is that agencies enable the law to keep pace with changing
circumstances and assist the ongoing quest for equal opportunity. Undoubtedly, agencies can do more with the cooperation of their co-equal
branches. But we would be left with less in their absence.

54. Chen, Dissertation, supra note 1, at 67; see also Ming H. Chen, Remarks at 40th
Anniversary of Lau v. Nichols: National Conference on the Rights of Linguistic Minorities
(Sept. 12, 2014).
55. Id. at 68.

56.

U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGTirs, VOTING RIGHTs

Acr:

TEN YEARS AFTER

(1975).
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